| RFC 9563 | SM2 Digital Signature Algorithm for DNSS | April 2024 |
| Zhang, et al. | Informational | [Page] |
This document specifies the use of the SM2 digital signature algorithm and SM3 hash algorithm for DNS Security (DNSSEC).¶
This document is an Independent Submission to the RFC series and does not have consensus of the IETF community.¶
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.¶
This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at its discretion and makes no statement about its value for implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by the RFC Editor are not candidates for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.¶
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9563.¶
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document.¶
DNSSEC is broadly defined in [RFC4033], [RFC4034], and [RFC4035]. It uses cryptographic keys and digital signatures to provide authentication of DNS data. DNSSEC signature algorithms are registered in the DNSSEC algorithm numbers registry [IANA].¶
This document defines the DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records (RRs) of new signing algorithms: SM2 uses elliptic curves over 256-bit prime fields with SM3 hash algorithm. (A description of SM2 can be found in GB/T 32918.2-2016 [GBT-32918.2-2016] or ISO/IEC14888-3:2018 [ISO-IEC14888-3_2018], and a description of SM3 can be found in GB/T 32905-2016 [GBT-32905-2016] or ISO/IEC10118-3:2018 [ISO-IEC10118-3_2018].) This document also defines the DS RR for the SM3 one-way hash algorithm. In the signing algorithm defined in this document, the size of the key for the elliptic curve is matched with the size of the output of the hash algorithm. Both are 256 bits.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
The implementation of SM3 in DNSSEC follows the implementation of SHA-256 as specified in [RFC4509] except that the underlying algorithm is SM3 with digest type code 6.¶
The generation of an SM3 hash value is described in Section 5 of [GBT-32905-2016] and generates a 256-bit hash value.¶
Verifying SM2 signatures requires agreement between the signer and the verifier on the parameters used. The SM2 digital signature algorithm has been added to [ISO-IEC14888-3_2018]. The parameters of the curve used in this profile are as follows:¶
p = FFFFFFFE FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 00000000 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF a = FFFFFFFE FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 00000000 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFC b = 28E9FA9E 9D9F5E34 4D5A9E4B CF6509A7 F39789F5 15AB8F92 DDBCBD41 4D940E93 xG = 32C4AE2C 1F198119 5F990446 6A39C994 8FE30BBF F2660BE1 715A4589 334C74C7 yG = BC3736A2 F4F6779C 59BDCEE3 6B692153 D0A9877C C62A4740 02DF32E5 2139F0A0 n = FFFFFFFE FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 7203DF6B 21C6052B 53BBF409 39D54123¶
SM2 public keys consist of a single value, called "P". In DNSSEC keys, P is a string of 32 octets that represents the uncompressed form of a curve point, "x | y". (Conversion of a point to an octet string is described in Section 4.2.8 of [GBT-32918.1-2016].)¶
The SM2 signature is the combination of two non-negative integers, called "r" and "s". The two integers, each of which is formatted as a simple octet string, are combined into a single longer octet string for DNSSEC as the concatenation "r | s". (Conversion of the integers to bit strings is described in Section 4.2.1 of [GBT-32918.1-2016].) Each integer MUST be encoded as 32 octets.¶
Process details are described in Section 6 of [GBT-32918.2-2016].¶
The algorithm number associated with the DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records is 17, which is described in the IANA Considerations section.¶
Conformant implementations that create records to be put into the DNS MAY implement signing and verification for the above algorithm. Conformant DNSSEC verifiers MAY implement verification for the above algorithm.¶
This document does not define algorithm aliases mentioned in [RFC5155].¶
A DNSSEC validator that implements the signing algorithms defined in this document MUST be able to validate negative answers in the form of both NSEC and NSEC3 with hash algorithm SHA-1, as defined in [RFC5155]. An authoritative server that does not implement NSEC3 MAY still serve zones that use the signing algorithms defined in this document with NSEC denial of existence.¶
If using NSEC3, the iterations MUST be 0 and salt MUST be an empty string as recommended in Section 3.1 of [RFC9276].¶
The following is an example of SM2 keys and signatures in DNS zone file format, including DNSKEY RR, NSEC3PARAM RR, NSEC3 RR with RRSIG RRs, and DS RR.¶
Private-key-format: v1.3
Algorithm: 17 (SM2SM3)
PrivateKey: V24tjJgXxp2ykscKRZdT+iuR5J1xRQN+FKoQACmo9fA=
example. 3600 IN DS 27215 17 6 (
86671f82dd872e4ee73647a95dff7fd0af599ff8a43f fa26c9a2593091653c0e
)
example. 3600 IN DNSKEY 256 3 17 (
7EQ32PTAp+1ac6R9Ze2nfB8pPc2OJqkHSjug
ALr4SuD9awuQxhfw7wMpiXv7JK4/VwwTrCxJ
wu+qUuDsgoBK4w==
) ; ZSK; alg = SM2SM3 ; key id = 65042
example. 3600 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 17 1 3600 (
20230901000000 20220901000000 65042 example.
lF2eq49e62Nn4aT5x8ZI6PdRSTPHPDixZdyl
lM6GWu4lkRWkpTgWLE4lQK/+qHdNS4DdTd36
Jsuu0FSO5k48Qg== )
example. 0 IN NSEC3PARAM 1 0 10 AABBCCDD
example. 0 IN RRSIG NSEC3PARAM 17 1 0 (
20230901000000 20220901000000 65042 example.
aqntwEYEJzkVb8SNuJLwdx7f+vivv5IUIeAj
62KP1QB93KRGR6LM7SEVPJVNG90BLUE8.example. 3600 IN NSEC3 1 1 10
AABBCCDD (
GTGVQIILTSSJ8FFO9J6DC8PRTFAEA8G2 NS SOA RRSIG DNSKEY NSEC3PARAM )
62KP1QB93KRGR6LM7SEVPJVNG90BLUE8.example. 3600 IN RRSIG NSEC3 17 2
3600 (
20230901000000 20220901000000 65042 example.
FOWLegTgFkFY9vCOo4kHwjEvZ+IL1NMl4s9V
hVyPOwokd5uOLKeXTP19HIeEtW73WcJ9XNe/ ie/knp7Edo/hxw== )
¶
[Example_Program] is an example program based on dnspython and gmssl, which supplies key generating, zone signing, zone validating, and DS RR generating functions for convenience.¶
IANA has registered the following in the "Digest Algorithms" registry within the "DNSSEC Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR) Type Digest Algorithms" registry group.¶
| Value | Digest Type | Status | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | SM3 | OPTIONAL | This document |
IANA has registered the following in the "DNS Security Algorithm Numbers" registry within the "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Algorithm Numbers" registry group.¶
| Number | Description | Mnemonic | Zone Signing | Trans. Sec. | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 17 | SM2 signing algorithm with SM3 hashing algorithm | SM2SM3 | Y | * | This document |
* There has been no determination of standardization of the use of this algorithm with Transaction Security.¶
The security strength of SM2 depends on the size of the key. A longer key provides stronger security strength. The security of ECC-based algorithms is influenced by the curve it uses, too.¶
Like any cryptographic algorithm, it may come to pass that a weakness is found in either SM2 or SM3. In this case, the proper remediation is crypto-agility. In the case of DNSSEC, the appropriate approach would be to regenerate appropriate DS, DNSKEY, RRSIG, and NSEC3 records. Care MUST be taken in this situation to permit appropriate rollovers, taking into account record caching. See [RFC7583] for details. A suitable replacement algorithm should be both widely implemented and not known to have weaknesses.¶
The security considerations listed in [RFC4509] apply here as well.¶