rfc9201.original   rfc9201.txt 
ACE Working Group L. Seitz Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) L. Seitz
Internet-Draft Combitech Request for Comments: 9201 Combitech
Intended status: Standards Track May 5, 2021 Category: Standards Track March 2022
Expires: November 6, 2021 ISSN: 2070-1721
Additional OAuth Parameters for Authorization in Constrained Additional OAuth Parameters for Authentication and Authorization for
Environments (ACE) Constrained Environments (ACE)
draft-ietf-ace-oauth-params-15
Abstract Abstract
This specification defines new parameters and encodings for the OAuth This specification defines new parameters and encodings for the OAuth
2.0 token and introspection endpoints when used with the framework 2.0 token and introspection endpoints when used with the framework
for authentication and authorization for constrained environments for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments
(ACE). These are used to express the proof-of-possession key the (ACE). These are used to express the proof-of-possession key the
client wishes to use, the proof-of-possession key that the client wishes to use, the proof-of-possession key that the
Authorization Server has selected, and the key the Resource Server authorization server has selected, and the proof-of-possession key
uses to authenticate to the client. the resource server uses to authenticate to the client.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 6, 2021. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9201.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology
3. Parameters for the Token Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Parameters for the Token Endpoint
3.1. Client-to-AS Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. Client-to-AS Request
3.2. AS-to-Client Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. AS-to-Client Response
4. Parameters for the Introspection Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Parameters for the Introspection Endpoint
5. Confirmation Method Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Confirmation Method Parameters
6. CBOR Mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. CBOR Mappings
7. Requirements when using asymmetric keys . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Requirements When Using Asymmetric Keys
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. Security Considerations
9. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. Privacy Considerations
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10. IANA Considerations
10.1. OAuth Parameter Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.1. OAuth Parameter Registration
10.2. OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings Registration . . . . . . 9 10.2. OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings Registration
10.3. OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings 10.3. OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings
Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Registration
11. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11. References
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11.1. Normative References
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11.2. Informative References
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Acknowledgments
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Author's Address
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments The Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments
(ACE) specification [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] requires some new (ACE) specification [RFC9200] requires some new parameters for
parameters for interactions with the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] token and interactions with the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] token and introspection
introspection endpoints, as well as some new claims to be used in endpoints, as well as some new claims to be used in access tokens.
access tokens. These parameters and claims can also be used in other These parameters and claims can also be used in other contexts and
contexts and have therefore been put into a dedicated document, to have therefore been put into a dedicated document to facilitate their
facilitate their use in a manner independent of use in a manner independent of [RFC9200].
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
Note that although all examples are shown in Concise Binary Object Note that although all examples are shown in Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR) [RFC8949], JSON [RFC8259] MAY be used as an Representation (CBOR) [RFC8949], JSON [RFC8259] MAY be used as an
alternative for HTTP-based communications, as specified in alternative for HTTP-based communications, as specified in [RFC9200].
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
Readers are assumed to be familiar with the terminology from Readers are assumed to be familiar with the terminology from
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], especially the terminology for entities [RFC9200], especially the terminology for entities in the
in the architecture such as client (C), resource server (RS) and architecture such as client (C), resource server (RS), and
authorization server (AS). authorization server (AS).
Terminology from [RFC8152] is used in the examples, especially Terminology from [RFC8152] is used in the examples, especially
COSE_Key defined in section 7 of [RFC8152]. COSE_Key, which is defined in Section 7 of [RFC8152].
Note that the term "endpoint" is used here following its OAuth 2.0 Note that the term "endpoint" is used here following its OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] definition, which is to denote resources such as token and [RFC6749] definition, which is to denote resources such as token and
introspection at the AS and authz-info at the RS. The Constrained introspection at the AS and authz-info at the RS. The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] definition, which is "An entity Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252] definition, which is "[a]n
participating in the CoAP protocol" is not used in this entity participating in the CoAP protocol", is not used in this
specification. specification.
3. Parameters for the Token Endpoint 3. Parameters for the Token Endpoint
This section defines additional parameters for the interactions with This section defines additional parameters for the interactions with
the token endpoint in the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. the token endpoint in the ACE framework [RFC9200].
3.1. Client-to-AS Request 3.1. Client-to-AS Request
This section defines the "req_cnf" parameter allowing clients to This section defines the "req_cnf" parameter allowing clients to
request a specific proof-of-possession key in an access token from a request a specific proof-of-possession key in an access token from a
token endpoint in the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]: token endpoint in the ACE framework [RFC9200]:
req_cnf req_cnf
OPTIONAL. This field contains information about the key the OPTIONAL. This field contains information about the key the
client would like to bind to the access token for proof-of- client would like to bind to the access token for proof of
possession. It is RECOMMENDED that an AS rejects a request possession. It is RECOMMENDED that an AS rejects a request
containing a symmetric key value in the 'req_cnf' field containing a symmetric key value in the "req_cnf" field
(kty=Symmetric), since the AS is expected to be able to generate (kty=Symmetric), since the AS is expected to be able to generate
better symmetric keys than a constrained client (Note: this does better symmetric keys than a constrained client. (Note: this does
not apply to key identifiers referencing a symmetric key). The AS not apply to key identifiers referencing a symmetric key.) The AS
MUST verify that the client really is in possession of the MUST verify that the client really is in possession of the
corresponding key. Profiles of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] using corresponding key. Profiles of [RFC9200] using this specification
this specification MUST define the proof-of-possession method used MUST define the proof-of-possession method used by the AS if they
by the AS, if they allow clients to use this request parameter. allow clients to use this request parameter. Values of this
Values of this parameter follow the syntax and semantics of the parameter follow the syntax and semantics of the "cnf" claim
"cnf" claim either from section 3.1 of [RFC8747] for CBOR-based either from Section 3.1 of [RFC8747] for CBOR-based interactions
interactions or from section 3.1 of [RFC7800] for JSON-based or from Section 3.1 of [RFC7800] for JSON-based interactions.
interactions.
Figure 1 shows a request for an access token using the "req_cnf" Figure 1 shows a request for an access token using the "req_cnf"
parameter to request a specific public key as proof-of-possession parameter to request a specific public key as a proof-of-possession
key. The content is displayed in CBOR diagnostic notation, without key. The content is displayed in CBOR diagnostic notation without
abbreviations and with line-breaks for better readability. abbreviations and with line breaks for better readability.
Header: POST (Code=0.02) Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "as.example.com" Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
Uri-Path: "token" Uri-Path: "token"
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor" Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload: Payload:
{ {
"req_cnf" : { "req_cnf" : {
"COSE_Key" : { "COSE_Key" : {
"kty" : "EC2", "kty" : "EC2",
"kid" : h'11', "kid" : h'11',
"crv" : "P-256", "crv" : "P-256",
"x" : h'BAC5B11CAD8F99F9C72B05CF4B9E26D24 "x" : h'BAC5B11CAD8F99F9C72B05CF4B9E26D24
4DC189F745228255A219A86D6A09EFF', 4DC189F745228255A219A86D6A09EFF',
"y" : h'20138BF82DC1B6D562BE0FA54AB7804A3 "y" : h'20138BF82DC1B6D562BE0FA54AB7804A3
A64B6D72CCFED6B6FB6ED28BBFC117E' A64B6D72CCFED6B6FB6ED28BBFC117E'
} }
} }
} }
Figure 1: Example request for an access token bound to an asymmetric Figure 1: Example Request for an Access Token Bound to an
key. Asymmetric Key
3.2. AS-to-Client Response 3.2. AS-to-Client Response
This section defines the following additional parameters for an AS This section defines the following additional parameters for an AS
response to a request to the token endpoint: response to a request to the token endpoint:
cnf cnf
REQUIRED if the token type is "pop" and a symmetric key is used. REQUIRED if the token type is "pop" and a symmetric key is used.
MAY be present for asymmetric proof-of-possession keys. This MAY be present for asymmetric proof-of-possession keys. This
field contains the proof-of-possession key that the AS selected field contains the proof-of-possession key that the AS selected
for the token. Values of this parameter follow the syntax and for the token. Values of this parameter follow the syntax and
semantics of the "cnf" claim either from section 3.1 of [RFC8747] semantics of the "cnf" claim either from Section 3.1 of [RFC8747]
for CBOR-based interactions or from section 3.1 of [RFC7800] for for CBOR-based interactions or from Section 3.1 of [RFC7800] for
JSON-based interactions. See Section 5 for additional discussion JSON-based interactions. See Section 5 for additional discussion
of the usage of this parameter. of the usage of this parameter.
rs_cnf rs_cnf
OPTIONAL if the token type is "pop" and asymmetric keys are used. OPTIONAL if the token type is "pop" and asymmetric keys are used.
MUST NOT be present otherwise. This field contains information MUST NOT be present otherwise. This field contains information
about the public key used by the RS to authenticate. If this about the public key used by the RS to authenticate. If this
parameter is absent, either the RS does not use a public key or parameter is absent, either the RS does not use a public key or
the AS knows that the RS can authenticate itself to the client the AS knows that the RS can authenticate itself to the client
without additional information. Values of this parameter follow without additional information. Values of this parameter follow
the syntax and semantics of the "cnf" claim either from section the syntax and semantics of the "cnf" claim either from
3.1 of [RFC8747] for CBOR-based interactions or from section 3.1 Section 3.1 of [RFC8747] for CBOR-based interactions or from
of [RFC7800] for JSON-based interactions. See Section 5 for Section 3.1 of [RFC7800] for JSON-based interactions. See
additional discussion of the usage of this parameter. Section 5 for additional discussion of the usage of this
parameter.
Figure 2 shows an AS response containing a token and a "cnf" Figure 2 shows an AS response containing a token and a "cnf"
parameter with a symmetric proof-of-possession key. parameter with a symmetric proof-of-possession key.
Header: Created (Code=2.01) Header: Created (Code=2.01)
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor" Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload: Payload:
{ {
"access_token" : h'4A5015DF686428 ... "access_token" : h'4A5015DF686428 ...
(remainder of CWT omitted for brevity; (remainder of CWT omitted for brevity;
CWT contains COSE_Key in the "cnf" claim)', CWT contains COSE_Key in the "cnf" claim)',
"cnf" : { "cnf" : {
"COSE_Key" : { "COSE_Key" : {
"kty" : "Symmetric", "kty" : "Symmetric",
"kid" : h'DFD1AA97', "kid" : h'DFD1AA97',
"k" : h'849B5786457C1491BE3A76DCEA6C427108' "k" : h'849B5786457C1491BE3A76DCEA6C427108'
} }
} }
} }
Figure 2: Example AS response with an access token bound to a Figure 2: Example AS Response with an Access Token Bound to a
symmetric key. Symmetric Key
Figure 3 shows an AS response containing a token bound to a Figure 3 shows an AS response containing a token bound to a
previously requested asymmetric proof-of-possession key (not shown) previously requested asymmetric proof-of-possession key (not shown)
and a "rs_cnf" parameter containing the public key of the RS. and an "rs_cnf" parameter containing the public key of the RS.
Header: Created (Code=2.01) Header: Created (Code=2.01)
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor" Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload: Payload:
{ {
"access_token" : h'D08343A1010AA1054D2A45DF6FBC5A5A ... "access_token" : h'D08343A1010AA1054D2A45DF6FBC5A5A ...
(remainder of CWT omitted for brevity)', (remainder of CWT omitted for brevity)',
"rs_cnf" : { "rs_cnf" : {
"COSE_Key" : { "COSE_Key" : {
"kty" : "EC2", "kty" : "EC2",
"kid" : h'12', "kid" : h'12',
"crv" : "P-256", "crv" : "P-256",
"x" : h'BCEE7EAAC162F91E6F330F5771211E220 "x" : h'BCEE7EAAC162F91E6F330F5771211E220
B8B546C96589B0AC4AD0FD24C77E1F1', B8B546C96589B0AC4AD0FD24C77E1F1',
"y" : h'C647B38C55EFBBC4E62E651720F002D5D "y" : h'C647B38C55EFBBC4E62E651720F002D5D
75B2E0C02CD1326E662BCA222B90416' 75B2E0C02CD1326E662BCA222B90416'
} }
} }
} }
Figure 3: Example AS response, including the RS's public key. Figure 3: Example AS Response Including the RS's Public Key
4. Parameters for the Introspection Endpoint 4. Parameters for the Introspection Endpoint
This section defines the use of CBOR instead of JSON for the "cnf" This section defines the use of CBOR instead of JSON for the "cnf"
introspection response parameter specified in section 9.4 of introspection response parameter specified in Section 9.4 of
[RFC8705]. [RFC8705].
If CBOR is used instead of JSON in an interaction with the If CBOR is used instead of JSON in an interaction with the
introspection endpoint, the AS MUST use the parameter mapping introspection endpoint, the AS MUST use the parameter mapping
specified in Figure 5 and the value must follow the syntax of "cnf" specified in Table 1 and the value must follow the syntax of "cnf"
claim values from section 3.1 of [RFC8747]. claim values from Section 3.1 of [RFC8747].
Figure 4 shows an AS response to an introspection request including Figure 4 shows an AS response to an introspection request including
the "cnf" parameter to indicate the proof-of-possession key bound to the "cnf" parameter to indicate the proof-of-possession key bound to
the token. the token.
Header: Created (Code=2.01) Header: Created (Code=2.01)
Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor" Content-Format: "application/ace+cbor"
Payload: Payload:
{ {
"active" : true, "active" : true,
skipping to change at page 7, line 25 skipping to change at line 274
"kid" : h'11', "kid" : h'11',
"crv" : "P-256", "crv" : "P-256",
"x" : h'BAC5B11CAD8F99F9C72B05CF4B9E26D24 "x" : h'BAC5B11CAD8F99F9C72B05CF4B9E26D24
4DC189F745228255A219A86D6A09EFF', 4DC189F745228255A219A86D6A09EFF',
"y" : h'20138BF82DC1B6D562BE0FA54AB7804A3 "y" : h'20138BF82DC1B6D562BE0FA54AB7804A3
A64B6D72CCFED6B6FB6ED28BBFC117E' A64B6D72CCFED6B6FB6ED28BBFC117E'
} }
} }
} }
Figure 4: Example introspection response. Figure 4: Example Introspection Response
5. Confirmation Method Parameters 5. Confirmation Method Parameters
The confirmation method parameters are used in The confirmation method parameters are used in [RFC9200] as follows:
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] as follows:
o "req_cnf" in the access token request C -> AS, OPTIONAL to * "req_cnf" in the access token request C -> AS, OPTIONAL to
indicate the client's raw public key, or the key-identifier of a indicate the client's raw public key or the key identifier of a
previously established key between C and RS that the client wishes previously established key between the C and RS that the client
to use for proof-of-possession of the access token. wishes to use for proof of possession of the access token.
o "cnf" in the token response AS -> C, OPTIONAL if using an * "cnf" in the token response AS -> C, OPTIONAL if using an
asymmetric key or a key that the client requested via a key asymmetric key or a key that the client requested via a key
identifier in the request. REQUIRED if the client didn't specify identifier in the request. REQUIRED if the client didn't specify
a "req_cnf" and symmetric keys are used. Used to indicate the a "req_cnf" and symmetric keys are used. Used to indicate the
symmetric key generated by the AS for proof-of-possession of the symmetric key generated by the AS for proof of possession of the
access token. access token.
o "cnf" in the introspection response AS -> RS, REQUIRED if the * "cnf" in the introspection response AS -> RS, REQUIRED if the
access token that was subject to introspection is a proof-of- access token that was subject to introspection is a proof-of-
possession token, absent otherwise. Indicates the proof-of- possession token, absent otherwise. Indicates the proof-of-
possession key bound to the access token. possession key bound to the access token.
o "rs_cnf" in the token response AS -> C, OPTIONAL to indicate the * "rs_cnf" in the token response AS -> C, OPTIONAL to indicate the
public key of the RS, if it uses one to authenticate itself to the public key of the RS if it uses one to authenticate itself to the
client and the binding between key and RS identity is not client and the binding between the key and RS identity is not
established through other means. established through other means.
Note that the COSE_Key structure in a confirmation claim or parameter Note that the COSE_Key structure in a confirmation claim or parameter
may contain an "alg" or "key_ops" parameter. If such parameters are may contain an "alg" or "key_ops" parameter. If such parameters are
present, a client MUST NOT use a key that is incompatible with the present, a client MUST NOT use a key that is incompatible with the
profile or proof-of-possession algorithm according to those profile or proof-of-possession algorithm according to those
parameters. An RS MUST reject a proof-of-possession using such a key parameters. An RS MUST reject a proof of possession using such a key
with a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request). with a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request).
If an access token is issued for an audience that includes several If an access token is issued for an audience that includes several
RS, the "rs_cnf" parameter MUST NOT be used, since the client cannot RSs, the "rs_cnf" parameter MUST NOT be used, since the client cannot
determine for which RS the key applies. This document recommends to determine for which RS the key applies. This document recommends to
specify a different endpoint that the client can use to acquire RS specify a different endpoint that the client can use to acquire RS
authentication keys in such cases. The specification of such an authentication keys in such cases. The specification of such an
endpoint is out of scope for this document. endpoint is out of scope for this document.
6. CBOR Mappings 6. CBOR Mappings
If CBOR is used, the new parameters and claims defined in this If CBOR is used, the new parameters and claims defined in this
document MUST be mapped to CBOR types as specified in Figure 5, using document MUST be mapped to CBOR types, as specified in Table 1, using
the given integer abbreviation for the map key. the given integer abbreviation for the map key.
/----------+----------+-------------------------------------\ +=========+==========+============+========================+
| Name | CBOR Key | Value Type | Usage | | Name | CBOR Key | Value Type | Usage |
|----------+----------+-------------------------------------| +=========+==========+============+========================+
| req_cnf | TBD (4) | map | token request | | req_cnf | 4 | map | token request |
| cnf | TBD (8) | map | token response | +---------+----------+------------+------------------------+
| cnf | TBD (8) | map | introspection response | | cnf | 8 | map | token response |
| rs_cnf | TBD (41) | map | token response | +---------+----------+------------+------------------------+
\----------+----------+------------+------------------------/ | cnf | 8 | map | introspection response |
+---------+----------+------------+------------------------+
| rs_cnf | 41 | map | token response |
+---------+----------+------------+------------------------+
Figure 5: CBOR mappings for new parameters and claims. Table 1: CBOR Mappings for New Parameters and Claims
7. Requirements when using asymmetric keys 7. Requirements When Using Asymmetric Keys
An RS using asymmetric keys to authenticate to the client MUST NOT An RS using asymmetric keys to authenticate to the client MUST NOT
hold several different asymmetric key pairs, applicable to the same hold several different asymmetric key pairs applicable to the same
authentication algorithm. For example when using DTLS, the RS MUST authentication algorithm. For example, when using DTLS, the RS MUST
NOT hold several asymmetric key pairs applicable to the same cipher NOT hold several asymmetric key pairs applicable to the same cipher
suite. The reason for this restriction is that the RS has no way of suite. The reason for this restriction is that the RS has no way of
determining which key to use before the client's identity is determining which key to use before the client's identity is
established. Therefore authentication attempts by the RS could established. Therefore, authentication attempts by the RS could
randomly fail based on which key the RS selects, unless the algorithm randomly fail based on which key the RS selects, unless the algorithm
negotiation produces a unique choice of key pair for the RS. negotiation produces a unique choice of key pair for the RS.
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
This document is an extension to [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. All This document is an extension to [RFC9200]. All security
security considerations from that document apply here as well. considerations from that document apply here as well.
9. Privacy Considerations 9. Privacy Considerations
This document is an extension to [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. All This document is an extension to [RFC9200]. All privacy
privacy considerations from that document apply here as well. considerations from that document apply here as well.
10. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
10.1. OAuth Parameter Registration 10.1. OAuth Parameter Registration
This section registers the following parameters in the "OAuth This section registers the following parameters in the "OAuth
Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuthParameters]: Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuthParameters]:
o Name: "req_cnf" Name: req_cnf
o Parameter Usage Location: token request Parameter Usage Location: token request
o Change Controller: IESG Change Controller: IETF
o Reference: Section 5 of [this document] Reference: Section 5 of RFC 9201
o Name: "rs_cnf" Name: rs_cnf
o Parameter Usage Location: token response Parameter Usage Location: token response
o Change Controller: IESG Change Controller: IETF
o Reference: Section 5 of [this document] Reference: Section 5 of RFC 9201
o Name: "cnf" Name: cnf
o Parameter Usage Location: token response Parameter Usage Location: token response
o Change Controller: IESG Change Controller: IETF
o Reference: Section 5 of [this document] Reference: Section 5 of RFC 9201
10.2. OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings Registration 10.2. OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings Registration
This section registers the following parameter mappings in the "OAuth This section registers the following parameter mappings in the "OAuth
Parameters CBOR Mappings" registry established in section 8.9. of Parameters CBOR Mappings" registry established in Section 8.10 of
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. [RFC9200].
o Name: "req_cnf" Name: req_cnf
o CBOR key: TBD (suggested: 4) CBOR Key: 4
o Change Controller: IESG Value Type: map
o Reference: Section 3.1 of [this document] Reference: Section 3.1 of RFC 9201
Original specification: RFC 9201
o Name: "cnf" Name: cnf
o CBOR key: TBD (suggested: 8) CBOR Key: 8
o Change Controller: IESG Value Type: map
o Reference: Section 3.2 of [this document] Reference: Section 3.2 of RFC 9201
Original specification: RFC 9201
o Name: "rs_cnf" Name: rs_cnf
o CBOR key: TBD (suggested: 41) CBOR Key: 41
o Change Controller: IESG Value Type: map
o Reference: Section 3.2 of [this document] Reference: Section 3.2 of RFC 9201
Original specification: RFC 9201
10.3. OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings Registration 10.3. OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings Registration
This section registers the following parameter mapping in the "OAuth This section registers the following parameter mapping in the "OAuth
Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings" registry established in Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings" registry established in
section 8.11. of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Section 8.12 of [RFC9200].
o Name: "cnf"
o CBOR key: TBD (suggested: 8)
o Change Controller: IESG
o Reference: Section 4 of [this document]
11. Acknowledgments
This document is a product of the ACE working group of the IETF.
Special thanks to Brian Campbell for his thorough review of this
document.
Ludwig Seitz worked on this document as part of the CelticNext
projects CyberWI, and CRITISEC with funding from Vinnova.
12. References Name: cnf
CBOR Key: 8
Value Type: map
Reference: Section 4 of RFC 9201
Original specification: [RFC8705]
12.1. Normative References 11. References
[I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] 11.1. Normative References
Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE) using the OAuth 2.0
Framework (ACE-OAuth)", draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-40
(work in progress), April 2021.
[IANA.OAuthParameters] [IANA.OAuthParameters]
IANA, "OAuth Parameters", IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters/oauth- <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.
parameters.xhtml#parameters>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
skipping to change at page 11, line 39 skipping to change at line 467
[RFC8747] Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Erdtman, S., and H. [RFC8747] Jones, M., Seitz, L., Selander, G., Erdtman, S., and H.
Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Tschofenig, "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR
Web Tokens (CWTs)", RFC 8747, DOI 10.17487/RFC8747, March Web Tokens (CWTs)", RFC 8747, DOI 10.17487/RFC8747, March
2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8747>. 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8747>.
[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object [RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949, Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020, DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
12.2. Informative References [RFC9200] Seitz, L., Selander, G., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and
H. Tschofenig, "Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments (ACE) Using the OAuth 2.0
Framework (ACE-OAuth)", RFC 9200, DOI 10.17487/RFC9200,
March 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9200>.
11.2. Informative References
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained [RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
Acknowledgments
This document is a product of the ACE Working Group of the IETF.
Special thanks to Brian Campbell for his thorough review of this
document.
Ludwig Seitz worked on this document as part of the CelticNext
projects CyberWI and CRITISEC with funding from Vinnova.
Author's Address Author's Address
Ludwig Seitz Ludwig Seitz
Combitech Combitech
Djaeknegatan 31 Djäknegatan 31
Malmoe 211 35 SE-211 35 Malmö
Sweden Sweden
Email: ludwig.seitz@combitech.com Email: ludwig.seitz@combitech.com
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