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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-pce-pceps-tls13-04" number="9916" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" updates="8253" obsoletes="" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.19.0 --> version="3" xml:lang="en">

  <front>
    <title abbrev="Updates for PCEPS">Updates for PCEPS: TLS Connection Establishment Restrictions</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-pce-pceps-tls13-04"/> name="RFC" value="9916"/>
    <author initials="D." surname="Dhody" fullname="Dhruv Dhody">
      <organization>Huawei</organization>
      <address>
        <email>dhruv.ietf@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Turner" fullname="Sean Turner">
      <organization>sn3rd</organization>
      <address>
        <email>sean@sn3rd.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="R." surname="Housley" fullname="Russ Housley">
      <organization abbrev="Vigil Security">Vigil Security, LLC</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>516 Dranesville Road</street>
          <city>Herndon, VA</city>
          <city>Herndon</city>
	  <region>VA</region>
          <code>20170</code>
          <country>US</country>
          <country>United States of America</country>
        </postal>
        <email>housley@vigilsec.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2024" month="January" day="09"/>
    <area>Routing</area>
    <workgroup>Path Computation Element</workgroup> year="2026" month="January"/>
    <area>RTG</area>
    <workgroup>pce</workgroup>
    <keyword>PCEP</keyword>
    <keyword>PCEPS</keyword>
    <keyword>TLS 1.3</keyword>
    <keyword>TLS 1.2</keyword>
    <keyword>Early Data</keyword>
    <keyword>0-RTT</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 48?>
<t>Section 3.4 of RFC 8253 specifies TLS connection establishment restrictions
for PCEPS; PCEPS refers to usage of TLS to provide a secure transport for
PCEP (Path the Path Computation Element Communication Protocol). Protocol (PCEP).  This document adds
restrictions to specify what PCEPS implementations do if they support
more than one version of the TLS protocol and to restrict the use of
TLS 1.3's early data.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found
  </front>
  <middle>
<!--[rfced] Regarding the title, even though "PCEPS" is explained in the
abstract, please consider updating the title so that at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pce-pceps-tls13/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion least "PCEP" is
expanded.

Original:
  Updates for PCEPS: TLS Connection Establishment Restrictions

Perhaps:
  Updates to the Usage of this document takes place on TLS to Provide a Secure Transport for the
       Path Computation Element Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:pce@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/pce/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/pce/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source Communication Protocol (PCEP)

Or:
  TLS Connection Establishment Restrictions for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/ietf-wg-pce/draft-ietf-pce-pceps-tls13"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 58?> the Secure Transport of
     the Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)

For comparison, here's the title of RFC 8253:
       PCEPS: Usage of TLS to Provide a Secure Transport for the
         Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)
-->
    <section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t><xref section="3.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8253"/> specifies TLS connection establishment
restrictions for PCEPS; PCEPS refers to usage of TLS to
provide a secure transport for PCEP (Path the Path Computation Element
Communication Protocol) Protocol (PCEP) <xref target="RFC5440"/>.  This document adds restrictions to specify
what PCEPS implementations do if they support more than one version of
the TLS protocol, e.g., TLS 1.2 <xref target="RFC5246"/> and
TLS 1.3 <xref target="I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis"/>, target="RFC9846"/>, and to restrict the use of
TLS 1.3's early data, which is also known as 0-RTT data. All other
provisions set forth in <xref target="RFC8253"/> are unchanged, including connection
initiation, message framing, connection closure, certificate validation,
peer identity, and failure handling.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The
      <name>Conventions</name>
        <t>
    The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
    NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
    "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
    described in BCP 14 BCP&nbsp;14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/>
    when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?> here.
        </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="tls-connection-establishment-restrictions">
      <name>TLS Connection Establishment Restrictions</name>
      <t><xref
      <t>Step 1 in <xref section="3.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8253"/> Step 1 includes restrictions on PCEPS TLS connection
establishment. This document adds the following restrictions:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>Implementations that support multiple versions of the TLS protocol <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
prefer to negotiate the latest version of the TLS protocol; see
<xref section="4.2.1" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis"/>.</t> target="RFC9846"/>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>PCEPS implementations that support TLS 1.3 or later <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use early data.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <dl>
        <dt>NOTE:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Early

<aside><t>NOTE: Early data (aka 0-RTT data) is a mechanism defined in TLS 1.3
<xref target="I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis"/> target="RFC9846"/> that allows a client to send data ("early
data") as part of the first flight of messages to a server.  Note
that TLS 1.3 can be used without early data as per Appendix F.5 of <xref target="I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis"/>. section="F.5" target="RFC9846"/>.  In fact, early data is permitted by TLS
1.3 only when the client and server share a Pre-Shared Key (PSK),
either obtained externally or via a previous handshake.  The client
uses the PSK to authenticate the server and to encrypt the early
data.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>NOTE:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>As
data.</t></aside>

<aside><t>NOTE: As noted in <xref section="2.3" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis"/>,
target="RFC9846"/>, the security properties for early data are
weaker than those for subsequent TLS-
protected TLS-protected data.  In particular, early
data is not forward secret, and there is no protection against the replay of
early data between connections.  <xref section="E.5" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis"/>
target="RFC9846"/> requires applications not use early data
without a profile that defines its
use.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl> use.</t></aside>

    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The

<!--[rfced] May we clarify the citation to RFC 9325 by adding "TLS/DTLS
recommendations" to the sentence below?

Original:
   The Security Considerations of PCEP [RFC5440], [RFC8231], [RFC8253],
   [RFC8281], and [RFC8283]; TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]; TLS 1.3
   [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis], and; [RFC9325] apply here as well.

Perhaps:
   The security considerations of PCEP [RFC5440] [RFC8231] [RFC8253]
   [RFC8281] [RFC8283], TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], TLS 1.3 [RFC9846],
   and TLS/DTLS recommendations [RFC9325] apply here as well.
-->

      <t>The security considerations of PCEP <xref target="RFC5440"/>, <xref target="RFC8231"/>, <xref target="RFC8253"/>,
<xref target="RFC8281"/>, and <xref target="RFC8283"/>; TLS 1.2 <xref target="RFC5246"/>; TLS 1.3 <xref target="I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis"/>, target="RFC9846"/>,
and; <xref target="RFC9325"/> apply here as well.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>There are no IANA considerations.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="implementation-status">
      <name>Implementation Status</name>
      <aside>
        <t>Note to the RFC Editor - remove this section before publication, as
  well as remove the reference to RFC 7942.</t>
      </aside>
      <t>This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in <xref target="RFC7942"/>.
The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort document has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not
be construed to be, a catalogue of available implementations or their
features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
exist.</t>
      <t>According to <xref target="RFC7942"/>, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit".</t>
      <t>At the time of posting the -04 version of this document, there are no
known implementations of this mechanism. It is believed that one
vendor has implementation, but these plans are too vague to make
any further assertions.</t> IANA actions.</t>
    </section>

  </middle>
  <back>

    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC8253">
          <front>
            <title>PCEPS: Usage of TLS to Provide a Secure Transport for the Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Lopez" initials="D." surname="Lopez"/>
            <author fullname="O. Gonzalez de Dios" initials="O." surname="Gonzalez de Dios"/>
            <author fullname="Q. Wu" initials="Q." surname="Wu"/>
            <author fullname="D. Dhody" initials="D." surname="Dhody"/>
            <date month="October" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP) defines the mechanisms for the communication between a Path Computation Client (PCC) and a Path Computation Element (PCE), or among PCEs. This document describes PCEPS -- the usage of Transport Layer Security (TLS) to provide a secure transport for PCEP. The additional security mechanisms are provided by the transport protocol supporting PCEP; therefore, they do not affect the flexibility and extensibility of PCEP.</t>
              <t>This document updates

	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8253.xml"/>
	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5440.xml"/>
	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5246.xml"/>
<!-- [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] -> [RFC9846]
draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-14
companion doc RFC 5440 in regards to the PCEP initialization phase procedures.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8253"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8253"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5440">
          <front>
            <title>Path Computation Element (PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP)</title>
            <author fullname="JP. Vasseur" initials="JP." role="editor" surname="Vasseur"/>
            <author fullname="JL. Le Roux" initials="JL." role="editor" surname="Le Roux"/>
            <date month="March" year="2009"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies the Path Computation Element (PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP) for communications between a Path Computation Client (PCC) and a PCE, or between two PCEs. Such interactions include path computation requests and path computation replies as well as notifications of specific states related to the use of a PCE 9846
in the context of Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) and Generalized MPLS (GMPLS) Traffic Engineering. PCEP is designed to be flexible and extensible so AUTH48 as to easily allow for the addition of further messages and objects, should further requirements be expressed in the future. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5440"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5440"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5246">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2</title>
            <author fullname="T. Dierks" initials="T." surname="Dierks"/>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="August" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5246"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5246"/>
        </reference> 1/16/26
-->
<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis"> anchor="RFC9846" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9846">
  <front>
      <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
      <author fullname="Eric Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla">
              <organization>Windy Hill Systems, LLC</organization> surname="Rescorla" fullname="Eric Rescorla">
         <organization>Independent</organization>
      </author>
    <date day="7" month="July" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) protocol.  TLS allows client/server applications to communicate
   over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
   tampering, and message forgery.

   This document updates RFCs 5705, 6066, 7627, and 8422 and obsoletes
   RFCs 5077, 5246, 6961, and 8446.  This document also specifies new
   requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-09"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9325">
          <front>
            <title>Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
            <author fullname="P. Saint-Andre" initials="P." surname="Saint-Andre"/>
            <author fullname="T. Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati"/>
            <date month="November" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) are used to protect data exchanged over a wide range of application protocols and can also form the basis for secure transport protocols. Over the years, the industry has witnessed several serious attacks on TLS and DTLS, including attacks on the most commonly used cipher suites and their modes of operation. This document provides the latest recommendations for ensuring the security of deployed services that use TLS and DTLS. These recommendations are applicable to the majority of use cases.</t>
              <t>RFC 7525, an earlier version of the TLS recommendations, was published when the industry was transitioning to TLS 1.2. Years later, this transition is largely complete, and TLS 1.3 is widely available. This document updates the guidance given the new environment and obsoletes RFC 7525. In addition, this document updates RFCs 5288 and 6066 in view of recent attacks.</t>
            </abstract> month="January" year="2026"/>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="195"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9325"/> value="9846"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9325"/> value="10.17487/RFC9846"/>
</reference>

	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/>
	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/>
	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9325.xml"/>

      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC8231">
          <front>
            <title>Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP) Extensions for Stateful PCE</title>
            <author fullname="E. Crabbe" initials="E." surname="Crabbe"/>
            <author fullname="I. Minei" initials="I." surname="Minei"/>
            <author fullname="J. Medved" initials="J." surname="Medved"/>
            <author fullname="R. Varga" initials="R." surname="Varga"/>
            <date month="September" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP) provides mechanisms for Path Computation Elements (PCEs) to perform path computations in response to Path Computation Client (PCC) requests.</t>
              <t>Although PCEP explicitly makes no assumptions regarding the information available to the PCE, it also makes no provisions for PCE control of timing and sequence of path computations within and across PCEP sessions. This document describes a set of extensions to PCEP to enable stateful control of MPLS-TE and GMPLS Label Switched Paths (LSPs) via PCEP.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8231"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8231"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8281">
          <front>
            <title>Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP) Extensions for PCE-Initiated LSP Setup in a Stateful PCE Model</title>
            <author fullname="E. Crabbe" initials="E." surname="Crabbe"/>
            <author fullname="I. Minei" initials="I." surname="Minei"/>
            <author fullname="S. Sivabalan" initials="S." surname="Sivabalan"/>
            <author fullname="R. Varga" initials="R." surname="Varga"/>
            <date month="December" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP) provides mechanisms for Path Computation Elements (PCEs) to perform path computations in response to Path Computation Client (PCC) requests.</t>
              <t>The extensions for stateful PCE provide active control of Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) Traffic Engineering Label Switched Paths (TE LSPs) via PCEP, for a model where the PCC delegates control over one or more locally configured LSPs to the PCE. This document describes the creation and deletion of PCE-initiated LSPs under the stateful PCE model.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8281"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8281"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8283">
          <front>
            <title>An Architecture for Use of PCE and the PCE Communication Protocol (PCEP) in a Network with Central Control</title>
            <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Farrel"/>
            <author fullname="Q. Zhao" initials="Q." role="editor" surname="Zhao"/>
            <author fullname="Z. Li" initials="Z." surname="Li"/>
            <author fullname="C. Zhou" initials="C." surname="Zhou"/>
            <date month="December" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Path Computation Element (PCE) is a core component of Software- Defined Networking (SDN) systems. It can compute optimal paths for traffic across a network and can also update the paths to reflect changes in the network or traffic demands.</t>
              <t>PCE was developed to derive paths for MPLS Label Switched Paths (LSPs), which are supplied to the head end of the LSP using the Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP).</t>
              <t>SDN has a broader applicability than signaled MPLS traffic-engineered (TE) networks, and the PCE may be used to determine paths in a range of use cases including static LSPs, segment routing, Service Function Chaining (SFC), and most forms of a routed or switched network. It is, therefore, reasonable to consider PCEP as a control protocol for use in these environments to allow the PCE to be fully enabled as a central controller.</t>
              <t>This document briefly introduces the architecture for PCE as a central controller, examines the motivations and applicability for PCEP as a control protocol in this environment, and introduces the implications for the protocol. A PCE-based central controller can simplify the processing of a distributed control plane by blending it with elements of SDN and without necessarily completely replacing it.</t>
              <t>This document does not describe use cases in detail and does not define protocol extensions: that work is left for other documents.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8283"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8283"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7942">
          <front>
            <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
            <author fullname="Y. Sheffer" initials="Y." surname="Sheffer"/>
            <author fullname="A. Farrel" initials="A." surname="Farrel"/>
            <date month="July" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t>
              <t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
        </reference>

	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8231.xml"/>
	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8281.xml"/>
	<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8283.xml"/>

      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 172?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>We would like to thank Adrian Farrel, Stephane Litkowski, Cheng Li, and
Andrew Stone <contact fullname="Adrian Farrel"/>, <contact fullname="Stephane Litkowski"/>, <contact fullname="Cheng Li"/>, and
<contact fullname="Andrew Stone"/> for their review.</t>
    </section>
  </back>

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ZoKtFwAA [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the online
Style Guide <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>
and let us know if any changes are needed.  Updates of this nature typically
result in more precise language, which is helpful for readers.

Note that our script did not flag any words in particular, but this should
still be reviewed as a best practice.
-->

</rfc>