DNSOP Working Group P. Thomassen Internet-Draft Secure Systems Engineering, deSEC Updates: 7344, 7477 (if approved) 15 September 2022 Intended status: Standards Track Expires: 19 March 2023 Consistency for CDS/CDNSKEY and CSYNC is Mandatory draft-thomassen-dnsop-cds-consistency-01 Abstract Maintenance of DNS delegations requires occasional changes of the DS and NS record sets on the parent side of the delegation. [RFC7344] automates this for DS records by having the child publish CDS and/or CDNSKEY records which hold the prospective DS parameters. Similarly, CSYNC records indicate a desired update of the delegation's NS records [RFC7477]. Parent-side entities (e.g. Registries, Registrars) typically discover these records by periodically querying them from the child ("polling"), before using them to update the delegation's parameters. This document specifies that if polling is used, parent-side entities MUST ensure that updates triggered via CDS/CDNSKEY and CSYNC records are consistent across the child's authoritative nameservers, before taking any action based on these records. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 March 2023. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. Thomassen Expires 19 March 2023 [Page 1] Internet-Draft cds-consistency September 2022 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Failure Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Multi-Homing (Permanent Multi-Signer) . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.1. DS Breakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.2. NS Breakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Provider Change (Temporary Multi-Signer) . . . . . . . . 4 3. Performing a Poll-based CDS or CDNSKEY Update . . . . . . . . 5 4. Performing a Poll-based CSYNC Update . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. Querying for CSYNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. Querying for Data Records (e.g. NS) . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Appendix A. Change History (to be removed before publication) . 8 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1. Introduction [RFC7344] automates DNSSEC delegation trust maintenance by having the child publish CDS and/or CDNSKEY records which hold the prospective DS parameters. Similarly, [RFC7477] specifies CSYNC records indicating a desired update of the delegation's NS records. Parent- side entities (e.g. Registries, Registrars) can use these records to update the delegation's DS and NS records. A common method for discovering these signals is to periodically query them from the child zone ("polling"), as described in Section 6.1 of [RFC7344] (CDS/CDNSKEY) and Section 3.1 of [RFC7477] (CSYNC). Thomassen Expires 19 March 2023 [Page 2] Internet-Draft cds-consistency September 2022 While [RFC7344] does specify acceptance rules (Section 4.1) for CDS/ CDNSKEY records that have been retrieved, it does not mention how specifically the poll queries should be done. For CSYNC, [RFC7477] leaves it up to the parent to decide from how many nameservers the records are retrieved (Section 4.2). A naive implementation would thus be likely to retrieve records from just one authoritative server, possibly by directing queries towards a trusted validating resolver. This may be fine if all authoritative nameservers are controlled by the same entity (typically the DNS operator). However, it poses a problem in conjunction with the multi-signer scenarios laid out in [RFC8901], both when deployed temporarily (during a provider change) or permanently (in a multi-homing setup). CDS/CDNSKEY/CSYNC records retrieved "naively" from one nameserver only may be entirely inconsistent with those of other authoritative servers. When several providers are configured and no consistency check is done, a single provider could (accidentally or maliciously) roll the DS or NS record set at the parent and, for example, remove the other provider's trust anchors and/or nameservers from the delegation. More detailed examples are given in Section 2. Whether in a permanent multi-homing setup or during provider change: A single provider should not be in the position to remove the other providers' records from the delegation. To address this issue, this document specifies that if polling is used, parent-side entities MUST ensure that the updates indicated by CDS/CDNSKEY and CSYNC record sets are consistent across all of the child's authoritative nameservers, before taking any action based on these records. Readers are expected to be familiar with DNSSEC, including [RFC4033], [RFC4034], [RFC4035], [RFC6781], [RFC7344], [RFC7477], and [RFC8901]. 1.1. Requirements Notation The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Thomassen Expires 19 March 2023 [Page 3] Internet-Draft cds-consistency September 2022 2. Failure Scenarios The following scenarios are examples of how things can go wrong when consistency is not enforced by the parent during CDS/CDNSKEY/CSYNC processing. Other scenarios that cause similar (or perhaps even more) harm may exist. The common feature of these scenarios is that if one DNS provider makes a mistake and the parent is not careful, DNS resolution and/or validation will break down, undermining the very guarantees of operator independence that DNSSEC multi-signer models are intended to provide. 2.1. Multi-Homing (Permanent Multi-Signer) 2.1.1. DS Breakage While performing a key rollover and adjusting the corresponding CDS/ CDNSKEY records, a provider could accidentally publish CDS/CDNSKEY records that only include its own keys. When the parent happens to retrieve the records from a nameserver controlled by this provider, the other providers' DS records would be removed from the parent. As a result, the zone is broken at least for some queries. 2.1.2. NS Breakage A similar scenario affects the CSYNC record, which is used to update the delegation's NS record set at the parent. The issue occurs, for example, when a provider accidentally includes only their own set of hostnames in the local NS record set, or publishes an otherwise flawed NS record set. If the parent then observes a CSYNC signal and fetches the flawed NS record set without ensuring consistency across nameservers, the delegation may be updated so that resolution is broken, or the multi- homing setup is silently reduced to a single-provider setup. 2.2. Provider Change (Temporary Multi-Signer) Transferring a domain from one (signing) DNS provider to another, without going insecure, necessitates a brief period during which the domain is operated in multi-signer mode: First, the providers include each other's signing keys as DNSKEY and CDS/CDNSKEY records in their copy of the zone. Once the parent detects the updated CDS/CDNSKEY record set at the old provider, the delegation's DS record set is updated. Then, after waiting for cache expiration, the new Thomassen Expires 19 March 2023 [Page 4] Internet-Draft cds-consistency September 2022 provider's NS hostnames can be added to the zone's NS record set, so that queries start balancing across both providers. (To conclude the hand-over, the old provider is removed by inverting these steps with swapped roles.) The multi-signer phase of this process breaks when the new provider fails to include the old provider's keys in the DNSKEY and CDS/ CDNSKEY record sets. One obvious consequence of that is that whenever the resolver happens to retrieve the DNKSEY record set from the new provider, the old provider's RRSIGs do no longer validate, causing to SERVFAIL responses. However, an even worse consequence can occur when the parent performs their next CDS/CDNSKEY scan: It may then happen that the incorrect CDS/CDNSKEY record set is fetched from the new provider and used to update the delegation's DS record set. As a result, the old provider is prematureley removed from the domain's DNSSEC chain of trust. The new DS record set authenticates the new provider's DNSKEYs only, and DNSSEC validation fails for all answers served by the old provider. 3. Performing a Poll-based CDS or CDNSKEY Update The terminology in this section is as defined in [RFC7344]. To retrieve a Child's CDS/CDNSKEY RRset for DNSSEC delegation trust maintenance, the Parental Agent, knowing both the Child zone name and its NS hostnames, MUST ascertain that queries are made against all of the nameservers listed in the Child's delegation from the Parent, and ensure that each key referenced in any of the non-empty answers is also referenced in all other non-empty answers. In other words, CDS/CDNSKEY records at the Child zone apex MUST be fetched directly from each of the authoritative servers as determined by the delegation's NS record set, with DNSSEC validation enforced. When a key is referenced in a CDS or CDNSKEY record set returned by one nameserver, but is missing from a least one other nameserver's non-empty answer, the CDS/CDNSKEY state MUST be considered inconsistent. Consistency is only REQUIRED across non-empty answers: Nameservers that provide valid proof of non-existence or do not respond SHOULD be disregarded. If an inconsistent CDS/CDNSKEY state is encountered, the Parental Agent MUST take no action. Specifically, it MUST NOT delete or alter the existing DS RRset. Thomassen Expires 19 March 2023 [Page 5] Internet-Draft cds-consistency September 2022 4. Performing a Poll-based CSYNC Update A CSYNC-based update consists of (1) polling the CSYNC record to determine which data records shall be synchronized from child to parent; (2) querying for these data records (e.g. NS) and placing them in the parent zone. Both steps are described separately below. If an inconsistent CSYNC state is encountered in the process, the Parental Agent MUST take no action. Specifically, it MUST NOT delete or alter any existing NS or other data RRset. 4.1. Querying for CSYNC When retrieving CYSNC record sets, the Parental Agent MUST ascertain that queries are made against all of the nameservers listed in the Child's delegation from the Parent, and ensure that the CSYNC record sets are equal across all non-empty answers. Otherwise, the CSYNC state MUST be considered inconsistent. For CSYNC queries, consistency is only REQUIRED across non-empty answers: Nameservers that provide valid proof of non-existence or do not respond SHOULD be disregarded. (This is like for CDS/CDNSKEY queries above.) 4.2. Querying for Data Records (e.g. NS) When retrieving data records (e.g. NS), the Parental Agent MUST ascertain that all queries are made against all of the nameservers listed in the Child's delegation from the Parent, and ensure that all answers received are equal. Otherwise, the CSYNC state MUST be considered inconsistent. Unlike for CSYNC queries, answers MUST be all non-empty and equal, or all empty. Unresponsive nameservers SHOULD be disregarded. If both an empty and a non-empty answer is received for a data record query, the state MUST be considered inconsistent. 5. Security Considerations The level of rigor mandated by this document is needed to prevent publication of a half-baked DS or NS RRsets (authorized only under an insufficient subset of authoritative nameservers). This ensures, for example, that an operator in a multi-homed setup cannot unilaterally remove another operator's trust anchor or nameservers from the delegation. As a consequence, the delegation's records can only be modified when there is consensus across operators. Thomassen Expires 19 March 2023 [Page 6] Internet-Draft cds-consistency September 2022 6. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005, . [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005, . [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005, . [RFC6781] Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC Operational Practices, Version 2", RFC 6781, DOI 10.17487/RFC6781, December 2012, . [RFC7344] Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344, DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014, . [RFC7477] Hardaker, W., "Child-to-Parent Synchronization in DNS", RFC 7477, DOI 10.17487/RFC7477, March 2015, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8901] Huque, S., Aras, P., Dickinson, J., Vcelak, J., and D. Blacka, "Multi-Signer DNSSEC Models", RFC 8901, DOI 10.17487/RFC8901, September 2020, . Thomassen Expires 19 March 2023 [Page 7] Internet-Draft cds-consistency September 2022 Appendix A. Change History (to be removed before publication) * draft-thomassen-dnsop-cds-consistency-01 | Allow for nameservers that don't respond or provide DoE (i.e. | require consistency only among the non-empty answers received) | | Define similar requirements for CSYNC. | | Editorial changes. * draft-thomassen-dnsop-cds-consistency-00 | Initial public draft. Author's Address Peter Thomassen Secure Systems Engineering, deSEC Berlin Germany Email: peter.thomassen@securesystems.de Thomassen Expires 19 March 2023 [Page 8]