Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM)
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General
Network Working Groupauthenticated encryption, mode of operation, AEAD, TODO
Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM) is an authenticated encryption with associated data block
cipher mode based on EtM principle. MGM is defined for use with 64-bit and 128-bit block ciphers.
Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM) is an authenticated encryption with associated data block
cipher mode based on EtM principle. MGM is defined for use with 64-bit and 128-bit block.
The MGM design principles can easily be applied to other block sizes.
The text will be added in the future versions of the draft.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT",
"RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
.
This document uses the following terms and definitions for the sets and operations
on the elements of these sets:
the set of all bit strings of a finite length (hereinafter
referred to as strings), including the empty string;
substrings and string components are enumerated from right to left
starting from zero;
the set of all bit strings of length s, where s is a non-negative integer;
the bit length of the bit string X (if X is an empty string, then |X| = 0);
concatenation of strings X and Y both belonging to V*, i.e., a string from V_{|X|+|Y|}, where the left substring
from V_{|X|} is equal to X, and the right substring from V_{|Y|} is equal to Y;
the string in V_s that consists of s 'a' bits: a^s = (a, a, ... , a), 'a' in V_1;
exclusive-or of the two bit strings of the same length,
ring of residues modulo 2^s;
the transformation that maps the string X = (x_{s-1}, ... , x_0) in V_s into the string
MSB_i(X) = (x_{s-1}, ... , x_{s-i}) in V_i, i <= s, (most significant bits);
the transformation that maps a string X = (x_{s-1}, ... , x_0) in V_s
into the integer Int_s(X) = 2^{s-1} * x_{s-1} + ... + 2 * x_1 + x_0
(the interpretation of the bit string as an integer);
the transformation inverse to the mapping Int_s (the interpretation of an integer as a bit string);
the block cipher permutation under the key K in V_k;
the bit length of the block cipher key;
the block size of the block cipher (in bits);
the transformation that maps a string X in V_s, 0 <= s <= 2^{n/2} - 1,
into the string len(X) = Vec_{n/2}(|X|) in V_{n/2}, where n is the block size of the used block cipher;
the addition operation in Z_{2^{n/2}}, where n is the block size of the used block cipher;
multiplication in GF(2^n), where n is the block size of the used block cipher;
if n = 64, then the field polynomial is equal to f = x^64 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1; if n = 128,
then the field polynomial is equal to f = x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1;
the transformation that maps a string L || R, where L, R in V_{n/2}, into the string incr_l(L || R ) = Vec_{n/2}(Int_{n/2}(L) [+] 1) || R;
the transformation that maps a string L || R, where L, R in V_{n/2}, into the string incr_r(L || R ) = L || Vec_{n/2}(Int_{n/2}(R) [+] 1).
An additional parameter that defines the functioning of MGM mode is the
size S of the authentication field (in bits). The value of S MUST be fixed for a particular protocol, 32 <= S <= 128.
The choice of the value S involves a trade-off between message expansion and the probability that an attacker can modify a message undetectably.
The MGM encryption and authentication procedure takes the following parameters as inputs:
Encryption key K in V_k.
Initial counter nonce ICN in V_{n-1}.
Plaintext P, 0 <= |P| < 2^{n/2}. If |P| > 0, then P = P_1 || ... || P*_q, P_i in
V_n, i = 1, ... , q - 1, P*_q in V_u, 1 <= u <= n. If |P| = 0, then by definition P*_q is empty, q = 0, and u = n.
Associated authenticated data A, 0 <= |A| < 2^{n/2}. If |A| > 0,
then A = A_1 || ... || A*_h, A_j in V_n, j = 1, ... , h - 1, A*_h in V_t, 1 <= t <= n. If |A| = 0,
then by definition A*_h is empty, h = 0, and t = n. The associated data is authenticated but is not encrypted.
The MGM encryption and authentication procedure outputs the following parameters:
Initial counter nonce ICN.Associated authenticated data A.Ciphertext C in V_{|P|}.Authentication tag T in V_S.
The MGM encryption and authentication procedure consists of the following steps:
The ICN value for each message that is encrypted under
the given key K must be chosen in a unique manner. Using the
same ICN values for two different messages encrypted with the same key eliminates the security properties of this mode.
Users who do not wish to encrypt plaintext can provide a string P of length zero. Users who do not wish to authenticate
associated data can provide a string A of length zero. The length of the associated data A and of the plaintext P MUST be such that 0 < |A| + |P| < 2^{n/2}.
The MGM decryption and authentication procedure takes the following parameters as inputs:
The encryption key K in V_k.The initial counter nonce ICN in V_{n-1}.The associated authenticated data A, 0 <= |A| < 2^{n/2}. A = A_1 || ... || A*_h, A_j in V_n, j = 1, ... , h - 1, A*_h in V_t, 1 <= t <= n.The ciphertext C, 0 <= |C| < 2^{n/2}. C = C_1 || ... || C*_q, C_i in V_n, i = 1, ... , q - 1, C*_q in V_u, 1 <= u <= n.The authenticated tag T in V_S.
The MGM decryption and authentication procedure outputs FAIL or the following parameters:
Plaintext P in V_{|C|}.Associated authenticated data A.
The MGM decryption and authentication procedure consists of the following steps:
The MGM mode was originally proposed in .
The MGM mode is designed to be fast, parallelizable, inverse free,
online and secure.
The MGM is based on counters for the reasons of performance.
The first counter (Y_i, see ) is used for message encryption, the second counter (H_i, see ) is used for authentication.
The second counter is encrypted eliminating the chance of obtaining any information about the H_k value in case when the H_l value is known to the
adversary ( here l is not equal to k ).
To provide parallelizable authentication a multilinear function is used.
To avoid attacks based on padding and linear properties of multilinear function
the lengths of associated data A, encrypted message C, and encrypting authentication tag is added.
A collision of "usual" counters leads to obtaining the information about the H_i values and
possible authentication vulnerabilities. To minimize the probability of this event we change the principle of counters operating by using
the functions incr_l and incr_r. To counteract finding collisions we encrypt initial values of both counters.
Parallel and double block cipher mode of operation (PD-mode) for authenticated encryption
Vladislav Nozdrunov
Information technology. Cryptographic data security. Block ciphers
Federal Agency on Technical Regulating and Metrology
Test vectors for the Kuznyechik block cipher (n = 128, k = 256) defined in (the English version can be found in ).
Evgeny Alekseev
CryptoPro
alekseev@cryptopro.ru
Ekaterina Smyshlyaeva
CryptoPro
ess@cryptopro.ru
Lilia Ahmetzyanova
CryptoPro
lah@cryptopro.ru
Grigory Marshalko
TC 26
marshalko_gb@tc26.ru
Vladimir Rudskoy
TC 26
rudskoy_vi@tc26.ru
Alexey Nesterenko
National Research University Higher School of Economics
anesterenko@hse.ru