Secure UAS Network RID and C2 Transport
HTT Consulting
Oak Park
MI
48237
USA
rgm@labs.htt-consult.com
AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville
NY
13495
USA
stu.card@axenterprize.com
AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville
NY
13495
USA
adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com
Linköping University
IDA
Linköping
58183
Sweden
gurtov@acm.org
Internet
DRIP
RFC
Request for Comments
I-D
Internet-Draft
RID
This document defines a transport mechanism for Unmanned Aircraft
System (UAS) Network Remote ID (Net-RID). The Broadcast Remote ID
(B-RID) messages can be sent directly over UDP or via a more
functional protocol using CoAP/CBOR for the Net-RID messaging. This
is secured via either HIP/ESP or DTLS. HIP/ESP or DTLS secure
messaging Command-and-Control (C2) for is also described.
Introduction
This document defines a set of messages for Unmanned Aircraft
System (UAS) Network Remote ID (Net-RID) derived from the ASTM
Remote ID broadcast
messages and common data dictionary. These messages are
transported from the UAS to its USS Network Service Provider
(Net-RID SP) either directly over UDP or via CoAP/CBOR (/).
Direct UDP, referred here as Minimal Net-RID (MNet-RID), and
CoAP/CBOR were selected for their low communication "cost". This
may not be an issue if Net-RID originates from the Ground Control
Station (GCS, ), but it
may be an important determinant when originating from the UA (). Particularly, very small
messages may open Net-RID transmissions over a variety of wireless
technologies.
An alternative message content for the Direct UDP Net-RID is also
provided. This sends the appropriate MAVlink messages rather than
the ASTM Remote ID broadcast messages of MNet-RID. This approach,
called here MAVlink Network Remote ID (MavNet-RID), will use more,
larger messages than MNet-RID, but may be easier to implement for
some UAS. An example where MavNET-RID may be preferred is where
the UAS endpoint is the GCS with the Internet access. Through C2,
it has all the MAVlink messages, and only needs forward appropriate
MAVlink messages on to the Net-RID SP. This is particular value
when the UAS is operating in an area that does not require
Broadcast RID but mandates Network RID.
This document also defines mechanisms to provide secure transport
for these Net-RID messages and Command and Control (C2) messaging.
A secure end-to-end transport for Net-RID (UAS to Network RID
Service Provider (Net-RID SP)) also should provide full
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Authenticity (CIA). It may seem
that confidentiality is optional, as most of the information in
Net-RID is sent in the clear in Broadcast Remote ID (B-RID), but
this is a potentially flawed analysis. Net-RID has evesdropping
risks not in B-RID and may contain more sensitive information than
B-RID. The secure transport for Net-RID should also manage IP
address changes (IP mobility) for the UAS.
A secure end-to-end transport for C2 is critical for UAS especially
for Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) operations. It needs to provide
data CIA. Depending on the underlying network technology, this
secure transport may need to manage IP address changes (IP
mobility) for both the UA and GCS.
Two options for secure transport are provided: HIP with ESP and DTLS 1.3
. These options are generally
defined and their applicability is compared and contrasted. It is
up to Net-RID and C2 to select which is preferred for their
situation.
MOBIKE is an alternative to HIP for ESP
key establishment. It functions enough like HIP that it was left
out, but implied, for document simplicity. There may be some
identity pieces needed to map HHITs and HIs to what MOBIKE uses.
To further reduce the communication cost, SCHC is defined for both the direct
UDP and CoAP layer . For
ESP "compression", ESP Implicit IV, and Diet ESP may be used
together. DTLS 1.3 as
defined in is fully
compressed. DTLS for MNet-RID would only benefit from UDP
compression. CoAP Net-RID and C2 could benefit from specific
application header compression.
UDP SCHC compression is handled separately here from IP header as
is currently defined by IP carrier (e.g. LoRaWAN, ). This is to allow for the
endpoints to not need to know what constrained carrier is in-path
and just design for worst case.
and will be covered in any specific implementation.
Terms and Definitions
Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Definitions
See for
common DRIP terms. The following new terms are used in the
document:
- B-RID
-
Broadcast Remote ID. A method of sending RID messages as
1-way transmissions from the UA to any Observers within
radio range.
- MNet-RID
-
A Minimal implementation of Network Remote ID, based on
B-RID messages directly over UDP.
- Net-RID
-
Network Remote ID. A method of sending RID messages via the
Internet connection of the UAS directly to the UTM.
- RID
-
Remote ID. A unique identifier found on all UA to be used
in communication and in regulation of UA operation.
Network Remote ID
In UAS Traffic Management (UTM), the purpose of Net-RID is to provide
situational awareness of UA (in the form of flight tracking) in a
user specified 3D volume. The data needed for this is already
defined in , but a
standard message format, protocol, and secure communications
methodology are missing. F3411, and other UTM based standards
going through ASTM and other SDOs, provide JSON objects and some of
the messages for passing information between various UTM entities
(e.g., Net-RID SP to Net-RID SP and Net-RID SP to Net-RID DP) but
does not specify how the data gets into UTM to begin with. This
document will provide such an open standard.
A full-function CoAP-based Net-RID protocol is defined in . This provides for either
transport of the appropriate B-RID messages and/or the data elements encoded in CBOR.
A minimal messaging approach (MNet-RID, ), only using the Broadcast Remote ID (B-RID)
messages in , is
sufficient to meet the needs of Net-RID. These messages can be sent
to the Net-RID SP when their contents change. Further, a UAS
supporting B-RID will have minimal development to add Net-RID
support.
This approach has the added advantage of being very compact,
minimizing the Net-RID communications cost.
Other messages may be needed in some Net-RID situations. Thus a
simple message multiplexer is provided for MNet-RID and CoAP is
defined for a richer messaging environment.
A MAVlink based messaging approach (MavNet-RID, ) is also provided. It differs
from MNet-RID in message content, but uses the same security
options. At this time, this approach is not complete; the minimal
set of MAVlink messages need to be added.
Network RID Endpoints
The US FAA defines the Network Remote ID endpoints as a USS Network
Service Provider (Net-RID SP) and the UAS. Both of these are rather
nebulous items and what they actually are will impact how
communications flow between them.
The Net-RID SP may be provided by the same entity serving as the UAS
Service Provider (USS). This simplifies a number of aspects of the
Net-RID communication flow. The Net-RID SP is likely to be stable in
the network, that is its IP address will not change during a
mission. This simplifies maintaining the Net-RID communications.
The UAS component in Net-RID may be either the UA, GCS, or the
Operator's Internet connected device (e.g. smartphone or tablet
that is not the GCS). In all cases, mobility MUST be assumed. That
is the IP address of this end of the Net-RID communication may
change during an operation. The Net-RID mechanism MUST support this.
The UAS Identity for the secure connection may vary based on the
UAS endpoint.
Net-RID from the UA
Some UA will be equipped with direct Internet access. These UA
will also tend to have multiple radios for their Internet access
(e.g., Cellular and WiFi). Thus multi-homing with "make before
break" behavior is needed. This is on top of any IP address changes
on any of the interfaces while in use.
Multicast (GEN-10 in )
over multiple Internet connection technologies MAY be used improve
QOS (GEN-7 in ) for
Net-RID. (Author's question: Is this really qualify as
multicast?)
Net-RID from the GCS
Many UA will lack direct Internet access, but their GCS are
connected. As an Operator is expected to register an operation
with its USS, this may be done via the Internet connected GCS. The
GCS could then be the source of the secure connection for Net-RID
(acting as a gateway).
There are two sources of the RID messages for the GCS, both from
the UA. These are UA B-RID messages, or content from C2 messages
that the GCS converts to RID message format. In either case, the
GCS may be mobile with changing IP addresses. The GCS may be in a
fast moving ground device (e.g. delivery van), so it can have as
mobility demanding connection needs as the UA.
In a constrained wireless environment for the UA that is not
functioning autonomously (i.e., at least C2 traffic to the GCS),
this approach may be the most economical. It only uses the
wireless to send the UA status once, to the GCS, that then provides
the Net-RID functionality.
Net-RID from the Operator
Many UAS will have no Internet connectivity, but the UA is sending
B-RID messages and the Operator, when within RF range, can receive
these B-RID messages on an Internet Connected device that can act
as the proxy for these messages, turning them into Net-RID messages.
Network RID Messaging
Net-RID messaging is tied to a UA operation (generally called a
flight or mission). This consists of an initial secure link setup,
followed by a set of mostly static information related to the
operation. During the operation, continuous location information
is sent by the UA with any needed updates to the mostly static
operation information.
The Net-RID SP SHOULD send regular "heartbeats" to the UAS. If the
UAS does not receive these heartbeats for some policy set time, the
UA MUST take the policy set response to loss of Net-RID SP
connectivity. For example, this could be a mandated immediate
landing. There may be other messages from the Net-RID SP to the
UAS (e.g., call the USS operator at this number NOW!). The UAS
MUST follow acknowledge policy for these messages.
If the Net-RID SP stops receiving messages from the UAS (), it should notify the UTM of a
non-communicating UA while still in operation.
Secure Link Setup
The secure link setup MUST be done before the operation begins,
thus it can use a high capacity connection like WiFi. It MAY use
the UA RID for this setup, including other data elements provided
in the B-RID Basic ID (Msg Type 0x0) Message. If the Basic ID
information is NOT included via the secure setup (including the
Net-RID SP querying the USS for this information), it MUST be sent
as part of the Static Messages ()
UAS Identity
The UAS MAY use its RID if it is a HHIT (DET per ). It may use some
other Identity, based on the Net-RID SP policy.
The GCS or Operator smart device may have a copy of the UA
credentials and use them in the connection to the Net-RID SP. In
this case, they are indistinguishable from the UA as seen from the
Net-RID SP. Alternatively, they may use their own credentials with
the Net-RID SP which would need some internal mechanism to tie that
to the UA.
HIP for ESP Secure Link
HIP for ESP Secure Link
is a natural choice for a DET RID. For this, the Net-RID SP would
also need a HHIT, possibly following the process in .
DTLS Secure Link
There are two approaches for DTLS secure
link.
The DET's HI may be encoded in PKIX SubjectPublicKeyInfo
format, and then follow .
Note that SubjectPublicKeyInfo only contains a DET's HI. The
parties in the DTLS setup will have to have a unique mapping of HI
to DET (i.e. the HID value).
Alternatively, DANCE may be used with a DET's DNS lookup to retrieve
a TLSA RR with the DET's
HI encoded in PKIX SubjectPublicKeyInfo format (per ). This has the added advantage
of the full DET is sent in the DTLS exchange as part of the DET
FQDN for DANCE.
The Net-RID SP DTLS credential may follow DANE or any other DTLS server credential method.
Static Messages
For simplicity, a class of UAS information is called here "Static",
though in practice any of it can change during the operation, but
will change infrequently. This information is the contents of the
B-RID Self-ID (Msg Type 0x3), Operator ID (Msg Type 0x5), and
System Messages (Msg Type 0x4). This information can simply be
sent in the same format as the B-RID messages. Alternatively the
individual data elements may be send as separate CBOR objects.
The Basic ID (Msg Type 0x0) Message may be included as a static
message if this information was not used for the secure setup.
There may be more than one Basic ID Message needed if as in the
case where the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) has mandated that
the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) assigned ID (UA ID type 2) and
Serial Number (UA ID type 1) be broadcasted.
The information in the System Message is most likely to change
during an operation. Noteably the Operator Location data elements
are subject to change if the GCS is physically moving (e.g.
hand-held and the operator is walking or driving in a car). The
whole System Message may be sent, or only the changing data
elements as CBOR objects.
These static message elements may be sent before the operation
begins, thus their transmission can use a high capacity connection
like WiFi. Once the operation is underway, any updates will have
to traverse the operational link which may be very constrained and
this will impact data element formatting.
The Net-RID SP MUST acknowledge these messages. The UAS MUST
receive these ACKs. If no ACK is received, the UAS MUST resend the
message(s). This send/ACK sequence continues either until ACK is
received, or some policy number of tries. If this fails, the UAS
MUST act that the Net-RID SP connection is lost and MUST take the
policy set response to loss of Net-RID SP connectivity. If the
information changes during this cycle, the latest information MUST
always be sent.
Vector/Location Message
Many CAAs mandate that the UA Vector/Location information be
updated at least once per second. Without careful message design,
this messaging volume would overwhelm many wireless technologies.
Thus to enable the widest deployment choices, a highly compressed
format is recommended.
The B-RID Vector/Location Message (Msg Type 0x1) is the simplest
small object (24 bytes) for sending this information as a single
CBOR object or via MNet-RID. It may be possible to send only those
data elements that changed in the last time interval. This may
result in smaller individual transmissions, but should not be used
if the resulting message is larger than the Vector/Location
Message.
The Minimal, UDP, Net-RID Protocol
The Minimal Network Remote ID protocol is a simple UDP messaging
consisting of a 1-byte message type field and a message field of
maximum 25-bytes length.
The Message Type Field is defined as follows:
The B-RID Message is 25 bytes:
The Net-RID SP ACK is 5 bytes:
The Net-RID SP Heartbeat is 4 bytes:
Compressing the MNet-RID message headers
The security envelope (ESP of DTLS) and UDP headers may be
compressed to further minimize the communication cost of MNet-RID.
Compressing ESP/UDP headers
A normal ESP/AES-GCM-12/UDP wrapper for the NMet-RID messages is
10+28+8=46 bytes. By applying the SCHC compression via and using
Implicit Cipher IVs, this
is reduced to 4+12+0=16 bytes.
AES-CCM-12 has a smaller, but valuable, size reduction on
compression, as CCM's IV is only 8 bytes compared to GCM's 16-byte
IV. Thus uncompressed, the wrapper is 10+20+8=38 bytes. Compressed
it is 4+12+0=16 bytes. Or "over the wire", compressed CCM offers
no improvements to GCM and its 2-pass process will tend to result
in a poorer performace compared to GCM, even on these small
messages. Thus GCM is the recommended mode-of-operation for AES.
Note that does not
provide implicit IV use for AES-GCM-12. At the time of writing the
use case for the smaller ICV was not apparent. Here, the smaller
hash is not a lower risk given the limited traffic within a single
operation. If not provided elsewhere, this document will request
ENCR_AES_GCM_12_IIV for IKE and both AES_GCM_12 and AES_GCM_12_IIV
for HIP.
may be
completely statically configured, or may have HIP or IKE negotiated
values. This will be determined by Net-RID SP policy.
TBD: diet-esp context and rules.
Compressing UDP/DTLS message headers
DTLS 1.3 is designed for
minimal hader overhead.
defines the DTLS header fields to use for minmal header size. The
only practical compression gain with SCHC would be the UDP header,
it could be compressed to zero bytes, but would require .
The DTLS header defined in with a 1-byte Sequence and no Length is 4 bytes.
Only AES-GCM-16 is defined for DTLS, but has an implicit IV for 16
bytes length. This along with the 8-byte UDP header is 28 bytes
total. Using SCHC for UDP header compression to zero bytes (and an
implicit SCHC rule) would require adding the DTLS 2-byte Length
field. This results in a further 6 byte header size reduction. The
resulting 22 bytes is similar to that in ESP compression above.
However the complexity of SCHC for only UDP compression may not be
of value in some implementations.
TBD: udp context and rules.
The MAVlink Net-RID Protocol
The MAVlink Network Remote ID protocol is also a simple UDP
messaging consisting of a 1-byte message type field as in MNet-RID,
the 3-byte MAVlink Msg ID, 1-byte LEN, and a message field of
maximum 255-bytes length.
The MAVlink Message Type Field is defined as follows:
It is initially identical to that in MNet-RID, but may deviate over
time, thus separately defined.
The MAVlink Message format is:
The MAVlink message length is included as this value may be needed
to successfully process some MAVLink messages.
The Net-RID SP ACK and Net-RID SP Heartbeat are the same as defined
in MNet-RID.
Compressing the MavNet-RID message headers
The security envelope (ESP of DTLS) and UDP headers may be
compressed to further minimize the communication cost of
MavNet-RID. This is the same as in MNet-RID with the added
potential rule to compress the MAVlink message length, as it can be
computed from the header length.
CoAP Net-RID messages
The CoAP based Net-RID protocol is intended for a richer
conversation between the UAS and USS. The USS, through the Net-RID
SP, may compare actual UA progress against the filed flight plan
and against other UA actual traffic. The USS may then send to the
UAS recommended changes to the flight plan to de-conflict traffic
or advise the UAS to avoid hazards (1st responder event, avoid
space). The UAS may then negotiate changes to the plan, and act on
them, as appropriate.
This sort of advanced UAS behavior is envisioned as part of total
UTM activities. Discussions now ongoing in UTM will provide the
data models and transactional UAS/USS interactions, that will drive
UAS communications past the MNet-RID defined in toward this more functional CoAP
Net-RID protocol.
Command and Control
The Command and Control (C2) connection is between the UA and GCS.
This is often over a direct link radio. Some times, particularly
for BLOS, it is via Internet connections. In either case C2 SHOULD
be secure from eavesdropping and tampering. For design and
implementation consistency it is best to treat the direct link as a
local link Internet connection and use constrained networking
compression standards.
Both the UA and GCS need to be treated as fully mobile in the IP
networking sense. Either one can have its IP address change and
both could change at the same time (the double jump problem). It
is preferable to use a peer-to-peer (P2P) secure technology like
HIPv2.
Finally UA may also tend to have multiple radios for their C2
communications. Thus multi-homing with "make before break" behavior
is needed. This is on top of any IP address changes on any of the
interfaces while in use.
Securing MAVLink
MAVLink is a commonly used protocol
for C2 that uses UDP port 14550 for transport over IP. Message
authenticity was added in MAVLink 2 in the form of a SHA-256
(secret | message) left-truncated to 6 byte. This does not
follow HMAC security recommendations,
nor provides confidentiality.
The MAVlink authentication only provides 24-bit collision
resistance but is not susceptible to a hash length attack. By
following the security approach here, UAS C2 is superior to that
currently provided within MAVlink. It provides 48-bit collision
resistance and full confidentiality.
Compressed ESP for MAVlink
The approach in can
be used to fully secure MAVlink and include the UDP header for IP
transport. Further, MAVlink itself can be compressed.
MAVlink messages contain a 1-byte Seq number and 2-byte CRC. Both
of these can be generated from SCHC rules. These 3 bytes along
with the 13-byte MAVlink signature provides the 16 bytes so that
the over-the-wire cost is the same.
This secure MAVlink format may be sent directly over a local
wireless link. The UDP port processing adds little cost. Sending
this over IP provides the needed confidentiality at 8 bytes less
than unencrypted messages.
TBD: MAVlink SCHC context and rules. These will be part of the
MAVlink ESP setup.
Compressed UDP/DTLS for MAVlink
At this time, DTLS is NOT recommended for C2 security, as it is
challenged with server mobility. It may be added at a later time.
DTLS may be viable when there is no possiblity for an IP address
change for the GCS during an operation. An example of this is
where the GCS is an Operations Center like might be used in a
package delivery business.
Secure Transports
Secure UDP-based protocols are preferred for both Network Remote ID
(Net-RID) and C2. Both HIPv2 and DTLS can be used. It will be shown
below that HIPv2 is better suited in most cases.
For IPv6 and CoAP over both WiFi and Bluetooth (or any other radio
link), SCHC is defined
to significantly reduce the per packet transmission cost. SCHC is
used both within the secure envelope and before the secure envelope
as shown in . For Bluetooth, there is also
IPv6 over Bluetooth LE for more guidance.
Local link (direct radio) C2 security is possible with the link's
MAC layer security. SCHC SHOULD still be used as above. Both WiFi
and Bluetooth link security can provide appropriate security, but
this would not provide trustworthy multi-homed security.
HIP for Secure Transport
HIP has already been used for C2 mobility, managing the ongoing
connectivity over WiFi at start of an operation, switching to LTE
once out of WiFi range, and returning to WiFi connectivity at the
end of the operation. This functionality is especially important
for BLOS. HHITs are already defined for RID, and need only be added
to the GCS via a GCS Registration as part of the UAS to USS
registration to be usedfor C2 HIP.
When the UA is the UAS endpoint for Net-RID (), and particularly when HIP is used for C2, HIP
for Net-RID simplifies protocol use on the UA. The Net-RID SP
endpoint may already support HIP if it is also the HHIT Registrar.
If the UA lacks any IP ability and the RID HHIT registration was
done via the GCS or Operator device, then they may also be set for
using HIP for Net-RID.
Further, double jump and multi-homing support is mandatory for C2
mobility. This is inherent in the HIP design. The HIP address
update can be improved with .
DTLS for Secure Transport
DTLS is a good fit for Net-RID for any of the possible UAS endpoints.
There are challenges in using it for C2. To use DTLS for C2, the
GCS will need to be the DTLS server. How does it 'push' commands
to the UA? How does it reestablish DTLS security if state is lost?
And finally, how is the double jump scenario handled?
All the above DTLS for C2 probably have solutions. None of them
are inherent in the DTLS design.
DTLS implementations SHOULD use a CID of 2 bytes. This is to
support mobility and simplify SCHC rule handling. The Sequence
Number size is a deployment choice. For MNet-RID rate of one
Vector/Location update per second, a 1-byte value would result in a
rollover in 4 minutes. This should not poise an operational
challenge. The length field is recommended when SCHC is used as it
can provided an authenticated length to use to regenerate the UDP
header length field and any application length field like that in
MAVlink.
Ciphers for Secure Transport
The cipher choice for either HIP or DTLS depends, in large measure,
on the UAS endpoint. If the endpoint is computationally
constrained, the cipher computations become important. If any of
the links are constrained or expensive, then the over-the-wire cost
needs to be minimized. AES-CCM and AES-GCM are the preferred,
modern, AEAD ciphers. shows that proper compression can provide the more efficient GCM
at no over-the-wire cost. Thus AES-GCM is the recommended AES
mode-of-operation.
NIST is working on selecting a new lightweight cipher that may be
the best choice for use on a UA. The Keccak Xoodyak cipher in is a good
"Green Cipher".
HIP and DTLS contrasted and compared
This document specifies the use of DTLS 1.3 for its 0-RTT mobility
feature and improved (over 1.2) handshake. DTLS 1.3 is still an
IETF draft, so there is little data available to properly contrast
it with HIPv2. This section will be based on the current DTLS 1.2.
The basic client-server model is unchanged.
The use of DTLS vs HIPv2 (both over UDP, HIP in IPsec ESP BEET
mode) has pros and cons. DTLS is currently at version 1.2 and based
on TLS 1.2. It is a more common protocol than HIP, with many
different implementations available for various platforms and
languages.
DTLS implements a client-server model, where the client initiates
the communication. In HIP, two parties are equal and either can be
an Initiator or Responder of the Base Exchange. HIP provides
separation between key management (base exchange) and secure
transport (for example IPsec ESP BEET) while both parts are tightly
coupled in DTLS.
DTLS 1.2 still has quite chatty connection establishment taking 3-5
RTTs and 15 packets. HIP connection establishment requires 4
packets (I1,R1,I2,R2) over 2 RTTs. This is beneficial for
constrained environments of UAs. HIPv2 supports cryptoagility with
possibility to negotiate cryptography mechanisms during the Base
Exchange.
Both DTLS and HIP support mobility with a change of IP address.
However, in DTLS only client mobility is well supported, while in
HIP either party can be mobile. The double-jump problem
(simultaneous mobility) is supported in HIP with a help of
Rendezvous Server (RVS). HIP can
implement secure mobility with IP source address validation in 2
RTTs, and in 1 RTT with fast mobility extension.
One study comparing DTLS and IPsec-ESP performance concluded that
DTLS is recommended for memory-constrained applications while
IPSec-ESP for battery power-constrained .
IANA Considerations
TBD: May need ESP ciphers defined.
TBD: Add MNet-RID Message Type Field to DRIP registry.
Security Considerations
Designing secure transports is challenging. Where possible,
existing technologies SHOULD be used. Both ESP and DTLS have stood
"the test of time" against many attack scenarios. Their use here
for Net-RID and C2 do not represent new uses, but rather variants on
existing depoyments.
The same can be said for both key establishment, using HIPv2 and
DTLS, and the actual cipher choice for per packet encryption and
authentication. Net-RID and C2 do not present new challenges, rather
new opportunities to provide communications security using well
researched technologies.
Acknowledgments
Stuart Card and Adam Wiethuechter provivded information on their
use of HIP for C2 at the Syracuse NY UAS test corridor. This, in
large measure, was the impetus to develop this document.
References
Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking - F3411−22a
ASTM International
Micro Air Vehicle Communication Protocol
Performance analysis of end-to-end DTLS and IPsec-based communication in IoT environments
Blekinge Institute of Technology